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ABSTRACT 
Despite enhancements to aviation security since September 11, 2001, there remain 
vulnerabilities from employees at airports.  This threat results from airline/airport 
employees that have access to sensitive and restricted areas during the normal course of 
their required duties.  This thesis evaluates the threat and the measures in place to prevent 
attacks from aviation insiders.  In addition, it evaluates a measure commonly referred to 
as 100 percent employee screening.  Finally, the thesis derives recommendations to 
enhance the current methods to reduce the vulnerability, as well as proposes additional 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Despite many enhancements to aviation security since September 11, 2001, there 
remain vulnerabilities from the insider threat (Transportation Security Administration 
[TSA], 2009).  This threat results from the risk that results when malicious airline/airport 
employees have access to sensitive and restricted areas during the normal course of their 
required duties.  This may include pilots, aircraft mechanics, aircraft fuelers and cleaners, 
and airline or contract employees who load baggage.  It may also include airport staff 
such as police officers and firefighters.  Physical barriers are in place to inhibit 
unauthorized entry into restricted areas; however, certain vulnerabilities continue to exist 
once the employee is through the physical barriers.    
The purpose of this thesis is to provide situational awareness of a vulnerability 
that exists within the commercial aviation domain and to advocate swift implementation 
of the actions necessary to significantly strengthen its resistance to the insider threat.   
A. BACKGROUND 
Aviation security in a post-9/11 world has been significantly improved.  The 
improvements have focused on reducing the threat of attack primarily through managing 
commercial aviation passengers, including increased passenger screening criteria, aircraft 
cockpit door hardening and the vetting of passengers through various Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice “watch-lists.”1  However, the threat 
from an attack by an insider has not been adequately addressed.   
The aviation security environment is susceptible to an attack by the very people 
who are employed to make commercial aviation a thriving business.  Commercial 
aviation employees have access to secure areas in U.S. airports that would offer them the 
unique ability to silently attack a commercial aircraft by overt or covert means.  Aviation  
 
                                                 
1 A watch list is a list of names used to compare passenger identification against a list of individuals 
known or suspected to be engaged in activities contradictory to aviation security. 
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employees, insiders with the proper motivation and equipment, could plant explosives, 
weapons or disable critical aircraft components that could cause large loss of life and 
business disruption to the U.S. economy.   
Over the last few decades and particularly since the terrorists’ attacks on U.S. 
aviation on September 11, 2001, the focus of U.S. aviation defensive posture has been on 
the commercial airline passenger.  This was a natural reaction to the most popular form of 
attack by terrorists.  Passenger identification and screening has undergone continuous 
modifications following each attack or attempted attack.  The hardening of cockpits doors 
was a direct reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001 in order to maintain the 
security of the cockpit.  Furthermore, carrying large quantities of liquids through airport 
screening was implemented following a plan to use volatile liquids to explode airliners 
over the Atlantic in 2006.  With the somewhat singular attention given to airline 
passengers by security experts, it is important to consider other threats and to work 
toward understanding and forecasting the next vulnerability that terrorists will attempt to 
exploit. Devoted terrorists will not simply give up the fight based on the fact that getting 
direct access to commercial aircraft as a passenger has become more difficult.  Terrorists 
will begin to explore other methods, where they find the least resistance, to carry out their 
attacks. 
One such vulnerability would be to either have a terrorist operative become an 
employee of an airline, thus having unescorted access in and around the aircraft or the 
opportunity to corrupt an incumbent employee into providing access or to act as an agent 
of the terrorist.     
While the number of terrorist related incidents involving insiders, such as the one 
above, is somewhat limited, there are a large number of incidents where insiders used 
their special airport access to conduct criminal behaviors.  Those behaviors include drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, and weapons smuggling.  There is clear potential for 
airport/airline employees involved in criminal activity to become, directly or indirectly, 
involved with terrorism and terrorist groups.  Should the insiders not be inspired for 
ideological reasons, they could be convinced for financial reasons.   
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Although the insider threat affects local environments at individual airports, the 
challenges, as well as the solutions, are much broader and impact the entire aviation 
system, various local law-enforcement organizations, private-sector air carriers, and 
federal agencies responsible for aviation security.   
B. THE AIRPORT OPERATOR’S ROLE 
Maintaining a transportation environment that is safe from sabotage or acts of 
terrorism is perhaps the most crucial duty of the airport operator.  An airport operator 
juggles many roles and has numerous responsibilities, which are outlined in federal 
regulations that are essential to safety and security.  One of these responsibilities, 
outlined in 49 CFR 1542.201 (4), is to mandate specific criteria to allow employees 
unescorted access to the secure areas of the airport.   
Airports typically adopt a multi-pronged approach in an effort to minimize the 
danger to aviation that is presented by the insider threat.  The most notable emphasis has 
been in physical-security requirements.  These physical-security requirements include 
guarded entrances, closed circuit television (CCTV), biometric devices (to ensure identity 
at the entrance), and random police patrol.  Unfortunately, due to the resourcefulness of 
the employee insider, these physical-security barriers are easy to navigate and decipher 
once the insider is embedded behind the scenes in the work place.   
C. FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCIES 
Airports and airlines are regulated by an array of federal agencies.  These 
agencies include, but are not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration FAA), 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA).  Federal regulation 49 CFR 1542.209 requires  employees that work at airports 
and have access to restricted areas are required to meet certain specific requirements for 
criminal history and pass background checks.  Once they have completed this process, 
they are issued airport identification media (badges) to allow them access to restricted 
areas.  A number of issues remain that are open to exploitation by perpetrators.   
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• Employees can receive a badge once found to be free of disqualifying 
crimes at the time of the badge application.  There could be other less 
significant crimes that may not disqualify an employee but could 
demonstrate a pattern of behaviors that may lead to more severe crimes at 
a later time. 
• Employees may not have any crimes at the time of application but may 
commit crimes after they receive their badge.  The crime may be one that 
would disqualify an employee from receiving a badge.  However, since 
the employee has already received a badge, and not required to go back 
through the background process, he/she may not be identified through the 
current system. 
• An employee may not have any disqualifying criminal convictions but 
could be corrupted by bribery or extortion to aid an individual or 
organization intent on doing harm to an aircraft.   
D. CONCERNS, CONSEQUENCES, AND COUNTERMEASURES 
The consequences of these vulnerabilities could be devastating.  An employee 
could simply carry a weapon into the restricted area and provide an individual or groups 
of perpetrators with weapons on the secure side of the airport after they have been 
processed by TSA passenger screeners.  Once inside the secure area, the armed 
perpetrators would have no additional security scrutiny prior to boarding an aircraft.  
Other means of sabotage could also occur such as placing explosives on aircraft in the 
cargo holds, damaging flight control or propulsion systems, or secreting other individuals 
through employee portals undetected.   
Congress, the media, and other groups have expressed concern at the current 
system.  One solution proposed by individuals within congress is 100 percent employee 
screening.2  Individual Congressmen have threatened 100 percent employee screening as 
a mandated and regulated solution to the dilemma.  In some cases, a pilot program for 
100 percent employee screening was conducted at several U.S. airports (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2007). It is generally agreed among aviation security professionals; this 
                                                 
2 One hundred percent employee screening in the context of this problem statement is defined by the 
Congressional Committee on Homeland Security in a report directing the Assistant Security of DHS to 
address vulnerabilities in aviation security by carrying out a pilot program to screen airport workers.  In this 
report 100 percent employee screening is described as application “of the same standards as apply to 
passengers at airport security screening checkpoints.” 
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is not a practical or realistic solution.  The cost of such a solution would be extraordinary 
and in some cases put commercial airlines out of business.  Likewise, the notion that 
airports could realistically screen their entire population of employees with over 100 
percent effectiveness over the course of the working day is naive at best.  Any fixed 
system, process, or procedure, such as 100 percent employee screening, will just be 
another measure that the insider will learn to manipulate.  Once employees learn the 
process, those that would inflict harm will learn ways to defeat the screening process.   
Airports and other critical infrastructure that have miles of secure perimeter to 
protect, all have similar vulnerabilities.  If an employee is required to go through a 
screening checkpoint as he/she arrives at work, there is not a measure in place or 
currently feasible to deny an insider from driving or walking to a remote location on the 
secure perimeter and passing weapons or other dangerous items over, under, or through 
the perimeter fence.  The screening of 100 percent of the employees only determines if 
they have authorization to be in the restricted area, and if they are free of weapons, 
explosive devices, or prohibited items at the point they are screened.  A multitude of 
other opportunities to acquire contraband are available to an insider following screening.   
Aviation security experts widely agree the proposed solution (100 percent 
employee screening) falls short of addressing the problem in a manner that would reduce 
the threat in such a way that would justify the expense (Government Accounting Office 
[GAO], 2009).  There is not a system that is capable of determining whether they are 
friend or foe.   
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to determine a course of action going forward, a central research question 
was developed.  The central research question stated simply was: 





In order to more fully inform the research, a series of sub-questions were 
developed to focus on what methods are currently being applied to the problem, what 
methods are being proposed, and what measures can be applied or enhanced to further 
address the problem.  The sub-questions were as follows: 
• How is the insider threat managed, and what are their strengths and 
weaknesses?  
• What methods of managing the insider threat are being proposed and what 
are their strengths and weaknesses?  
• How can current methods be further enhanced to strengthen commercial 
aviation against the insider threat? 
F. ARGUMENT 
The insider threat presents a significant threat to commercial aviation security. A 
person on the inside is a subject matter expert in his area of operations as well as having 
an above average knowledge of the workings of the airport and its security.    
Given that insiders are quick to learn how to work any system that may be put 
into place, it seems that a more sophisticated approach is in order.  For an approach to be 
effective in detecting and deterring an insider, it should be a dynamic system that is based 
on varying levels of security in a layered fashion, executed in a random manner (Elias, 
2009).  
The focus of this research will be to develop recommendations to policy makers 
on enhanced and alternative methods to identify employees and behaviors that may 
present a threat to aviation security.  The recommendations will be derived from a review 
of existing procedures employed for vetting airport employees.  In addition, enhanced 
and alterative measures not currently employed in the aviation environment will be 
evaluated to consider their value in further security the integrity of the restricted area.      
G. SIGNIFICANCE AND SUMMARY 
The threat posed by aviation insiders is a highly complex problem.  It is unlikely 
that U.S. aviation will ever be able to eliminate the threat posed by aviation insiders; 
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however, measures can be taken in the short term to improve the resistance of the current 
aviation environment to the threat.  This thesis explores the vulnerabilities with the 
current system and makes recommendations to close the gap posed by nefarious aviation 
insiders.   
This thesis will allow policy makers to view the problem presented in a 
comprehensive yet uncomplicated manner.  It will allow policy makers the opportunity to 
understand the problem, its magnitude and its potential consequences.  More importantly, 
this thesis lays out a pathway to significantly reduce the vulnerability to aviation 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Aviation security and the betrayal threat presented by insiders received attention 
following September 11, 2001; however, it has been a concern prior to those attacks.  
Government officials called for security increases addressing the insider threat before the 
attacks of 9/11 (Miller & Dover, 1998).  Following the attacks of September 11, the 9/11 
Commission specifically recommended the Transportation Security Administration 
develop a plan that included enemy tactics such as insider threat in its final report 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 
2004).   
Detection and deterrence of the insider threat in aviation continues to evolve as a 
regulatory matter.  The U.S. government, specifically the TSA has been charged by 
Congress to execute laws created by legislative means to hold airports and airlines 
accountable for the behavior of rouge employees.   
While aviation security has been a topic of discussion for many years, the events 
of 9/11 moved aviation security to center stage.  U.S. airports remain at an elevated level 
of security.  This heightened level of security, level orange, is one level above the rest of 
the United States, currently at level yellow.  Recently, the discussion brought to the 
forefront of the debate by many aviation experts, congress and concerned citizens, is the 
issue of insider threat.  This is the result of the widely publicized arrest of individuals 
working in the aviation industry for charges ranging from theft; to the smuggling of guns, 
drugs, cash, and illegal aliens in commercial aircraft (GAO, 2009).  Congress, the public, 
and aviation experts recognize the opportunity these criminal networks and activities 
pose to those that would seek to perform acts of terrorism in aviation.   
Volumes of literature have been published that suggest the threat to aviation 
security by the insider threat is a possibility.  Congress, aviation experts, the media, and 
the traveling public all agree the threat to aviation security presented by employees who 
have unescorted access to sterile areas of airports, present vulnerabilities.  The  
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recognition of the vulnerability was evidenced in literature from congressional testimony, 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, professional trade journals and “for 
official use only” reports. 
A review of the available literature on the matter of aviation insider threat was 
conducted.  Generally, some literature was available on the topic but by in large it was 
confined to a few areas.  Those areas were: 
• Is the threat from aviation insiders legitimate? 
• What is the national strategy on aviation security? 
• How do the federal regulations address aviation security and the insider 
threat? 
• Who are the “insiders”? 
• What methods to manage the insider threat are being written about? 
A. IS THERE A THREAT FROM AVIATION INSIDERS? 
Literature is available that highlighted the vulnerability to aviation by the threat 
posed by insiders.  The literature is presented in reports regarding criminal activity by 
aviation employees.  This literature is relevant in legitimizing the insider threat as a valid 
method of perpetuating violence against commercial aviation.  In light of the absence of a 
large number of more relevant examples of insider activities of this nature, the literature 
demonstrates the vulnerability exists, despite the fact that it has not been used to 
perpetuate a terrorist attack.   
As recently as September 2009, Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old Afghan immigrant 
and former Denver airport shuttle-van driver, was arrested on federal terrorism 
conspiracy charges (Bliss & Blum, 2009).   
One recent report regarding fraudulent acquisition of security badges by illegal 
immigrants, highlighted vulnerability in determining employee identity (12 Charged, 
2009).  The report outlined a sting at a New York airport where 12 employees were 




acquire airport security badges (12 Charged, 2009). While this does not constitute a 
terrorist ring, it does demonstrate the ability for individuals to be granted access to secure 
areas under the pretense of legitimate means.   
Another similar incident occurred at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport where the owner 
of a temporary employment agency was sentenced in October 2009 to three years in 
prison (Chicago Tribune, 2009).  The owner had manufactured dozens of fake security 
badges for her mostly illegally immigrated staff, allowing them to perform duties in the 
secure area of the airport.  Here again, this fraud was perpetrated not for the intent of a 
terrorist attack but to enable workers that would otherwise not qualify for a legitimate 
security badge due to immigration status, to work in the restricted area of the airport.  
Nevertheless, the nexus to terrorism utilizing the same method of operation was 
emphasized by the local news agency. 
In 2008, an elevator mechanic was arrested for smuggling at least 17 illegal 
immigrants including two with criminal records.  He is suspected of being part of a larger 
smuggling ring that used him to gain access to restricted areas at Los Angeles Airport 
(LAX) (Wikel, 2008). 
In: 
…June, 2007, four individuals were charged with conspiring to attack JFK 
Airport by planting explosives to blow up the airport’s major jet-fuel tanks 
and pipeline.  The plot aimed at detonating the fuel tanks, resulting in 
exploding fuel pipes running underneath passenger terminals.  The four 
individuals including a former JFK cargo worker, Justin DeFreitas were 
arrested.  DeFreitas was dispatched to conduct surveillance on the pipeline 
starting in January 2007.  DeFreitas used his knowledge of air and ground 
operations at the airport to survey possible targets. (Collins, 2010) 
The nexus to terrorism in these cases is limited; however, the ability for a 
malicious insider with a desire to inflict violence through their unescorted access to 
secure areas is obvious.  
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B. NATIONAL STRATEGIES 
The National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS) was published in March, 
2007 (White House).  The broad strategic plan does not specifically address the threat to 
aviation from insider attack.  However, it does acknowledge, in broad terms, that “the 
Department of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall national 
effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure” (White House, 2007, p. 13).  It 
continues by indicating the major areas of national security to include, “…investing in 
protective measures such as staff identification and credentialing, access control, and 
physical security of fixed sites” (White House, 2007, p. 13).   
The Aviation Transportation System Security Plan (ATSSP) intended to support 
the NSAS was published on the same (2007). This plan provides additional granularity to 
the National Strategy by developing and implementing measures to reduce vulnerabilities 
within the aviation transportation system.  The ATSSP outlines three critical system areas 
to further reduce vulnerabilities.  One of the three critical system areas it mentions is to 
“ensure that anyone entering or using the aviation transportation system has been 
identified and vetted or screened” (Aviation Transportation, 2007, p. 1).  It elaborates on 
this area by indicating a direction to explore access controls, adding biometric identifiers 
to employee credentials as well as enhancing physical security programs to apply to all 
airport employees and vendors. 
C. FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the regulatory authority for aviation security was 
held by the FAA.  A final rulemaking change was made in February, 2002 that assigned 
this authority to the newly created TSA (Department of Transportation [DOT], 2002).  
Regulations found in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) at 49 CFR Parts 1500, 
mandate the various aspects of aviation security shared by the TSA, the airport operator, 
and the aircraft operator.  The regulations are very broad in the various aspects of 
aviation security such as passenger screening, law enforcement responsibilities, airport 
security program, and operations to name a few.  The areas of particular relevance for 
this literature review are confined to the topic of insider threat.  While the term insider 
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threat is absent from the regulation, the rules and regulations include the various aspects 
of identifying, eligibility, credentialing, and training of airport workers.   
D. WHO ARE THE INSIDER THREATS? 
Limited literature is available to assist security experts in developing profiles of 
individuals that have exhibited malicious insider attacks in advance of violent action.  
One such source was an article entitled, “Refining Insider Threat Profiles” (Kirkpatrick, 
2008).  This article was focused on the broader context of insider threat beyond aviation.  
This included information systems and financial institutions.  The author, Kirkpatrick, 
provided a categorization of insider motivations to include disgruntled employees, insider 
threats brought on by nationalistic reasons, greed motivations, as well as ideology.  The 
article concluded with offering that raising awareness of the numerous types of insider 
threats among practitioners and researchers can help to advance the understanding of new 
indicators that may assist in identifying threats in advance of attack (Kirkpatrick, 2008).  
The article fell short of providing any concrete actions that security practitioners could 
employ to manage the insider threat.  Generally, it indicated a need for additional 
research in the subject area.   
The first written evidence I was able to find during the literature review of 
specific aviation awareness of the insider threat, was unclassified/for official use only 
(U/FOUO) reports beginning in 2007.  The DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) published a Joint Homeland Security Assessment in August 2007 (Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007).  This four-
page U/FOUO report revealed three key findings that summarized three plots to attack 
U.S. interests.   
In April 2008, the TSA published a U/FOUO information bulletin titled, “Clean 
Skins, Lone Wolves, and Insiders” (Transportation Intelligence Gazette [TIG], 2008).  
This four-page report provided definitions and examples of the three actors referred to in 
the report as Clean Skins, Lone Wolves, and Insiders (TSA/TIG 2008).  The bulletin was 
useful in continuing to raise awareness of the existence of violent actors but failed to 
provide any guidance to the end user on how to detect or manage the insider threat.   
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In February 2009, the TSA’s Office of Intelligence published a U/FOUO bulletin 
(TSA/Office of Intelligence [TSA/OIS], 2009).  Here again, this bulletin was useful for 
raising awareness among security practitioners regarding the potential for threats to 
emerge from within the aviation industry.  The bulletin described plots and actors that 
had participated in planning for attacks (TSA/OIS, 2009).  In some cases, these examples 
were republished from the 2007 and 2008 reports.  No suggested actions were included in 
this report as to how to detect or manage insider threats.   
E. METHODS TO MANAGE THE THREAT 
A number of methods to manage the threat were documented.  Those methods 
included the development of a previously discussed threat profile, 100 percent employee 
screening, managing insider threats using threat assessment methods, technological 
solutions such as biometric systems, surveillance, and tracking.   
One hundred percent employee screening, the physical screening of employees 
prior to entering secure areas, has been proposed as one the solutions to mitigate the 
threat posed to aviation by the insider.  Some members of the U.S. Congress have been 
vocal and supportive in this regard (TSA, 2008).  Opinions vary on the practicality and 
feasibility of screening employees prior to having access to secure airport areas.   
Managing insider threats using threat assessments is documented in one aviation 
management journal (Randazzo, 2008).  This journal article provides a list of warning 
signs that allow aviation security managers to monitor what might be precursors to 
violent activity perpetrated by an insider (Randazzo, 2008).  In addition, the article 
provides a step-by-step method to create and develop threat assessment capacity 
(Randazzo, 2008).  While this is useful in detecting and managing the threats from 
traditional insiders, those who seek revenge against a company or who are otherwise 
disgruntled, it does not recognize the threat from a non-traditional actor such as an 
ideologically motivated insider actor.  
Another area addressing insider threat management methods are those derived 
from technological solutions.  A diverse array of technological solutions such as 
biometric systems, surveillance, and tracking are on the market and well documented.  
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While many private manufacturers provide compelling and sophisticated use of 
technology to monitor the movement of employees and to insure proper identification of 
employees, professionals should be suspicious of salesman that may have financial 
reasons to make the reader believe their product provides the highest degree of protection 
from the insider threat.   
The literatures published by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) are the 
most comprehensive in terms of the insider threat to aviation.  Despite the fact they are 
comprehensive, the GAO reports to Congress (GAO, 2004; GAO 2009) focus on the fact 
that insider threat is a potential security issue and 100 percent employee screening is 
expensive and an ineffective approach.  With the focus of the GAO reports being on 
recognition of the threat and reviewing only a single method of mitigating the threat, they 
were not particularly useful in evaluating other enhancements that would diminish the 
threat to commercial aviation.  GAO reports, as well as the other literature included in 
this review, are absent any strong direction, regulatory or voluntarily to provide a 
consistent, innovative management approach or plan addressing the vulnerability 
presented by the insider threat.   
In reviewing the literature, it appears that government officials, federal and local, 
are unable to see past the prescriptive elements of physical security.  In order to be more 
effective at identify employees that would desire to do intentional harm to aviation; a 
more comprehensive approach would present a more reliable outcome.  A comprehensive 
approach that includes a more thorough and perpetual vetting of employee’s background, 
including physical security measures, would yield the most likely positive outcome.  It 
should also, be understood that no measure will completely eliminate the threat.  Waiting 
for the perfect solution impedes progress and should not be used as an excuse to do 

















A policy analysis methodology will be applied to this thesis.  This methodology is 
appropriate to answer the research questions, as policies are currently in places that are, 
in part, set in place to disrupt threats from aviation insiders.  In order to recommend 
enhancements or a change in direction, it would be critical to fully understand the 
policies in place.  Once clarity in understanding what the policies were intended to 
address, it would be beneficial to the research to analyze the results of the measures to 
determine if the policies were effective, or if they needed to be rewritten or strengthened 
through amendments to the existing policies.  The policy analysis would allow for the 
exposure of policy strengths and weakness.   
Federal regulations, specifically 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1542 and 
49 CFR 1544, mandate requirements for airport operators, commercial airline companies, 
concession companies as well as individuals that apply for and/or receive security 
credentials to allow employees to access secure areas within the airport environment.  
This thesis will provide an analysis of the existing federal requirements, under 49 CFR 
1542 and 1544, and recommend modifications to the requirements to further strengthen 
the current policies and practices.   
B. SAMPLE 
Sample data was collected during a review of records at the Dallas-Fort Worth 
International Airport (DFW).  While minimum requirements for the identification and 
checking of employee history, through criminal history records checks, security threat 
assessments and employee name comparisons against the “no-fly” list and other “watch 
lists” are provided within the policy, DFW Airport exceeds the requirements in certain 
areas. Although DFW Airport represents a single source of data, it is the third busiest 
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airport in the world and has a large employee population (approximately 30,000).3  Data 
was provided by DFW Airport, including employee data, which served to provide a large 
sample of how some measures might influence an airport’s ability to reduce potential 
threats from unscrupulous employees.   
Beginning in 2007, DFW Airport began to randomly submit 15 percent of all 
badge renewals for a criminal history records check.4  As a result of this new procedure, 
over the minimum requirements of the policy, data accumulated over the three-year 
period is available to analyze the effectiveness of the new enhanced procedure or the in-
effectiveness of the existing policy.  In addition, the data would be helpful in determining 
if a higher number of badge renewals should be subjected to the same criteria as a 
minimum requirement.  This data will also demonstrate the effectiveness of the policy 
that requires employees convicted of one of the policies’ 28 disqualifying crimes and 
must self-report the conviction was effective.  The number of employees discovered to 
have convictions disqualifying them from badge renewal would serve to verify the 
hypothesis that employees have no compelling reason to self-report convictions.  
Therefore, the analysis will consider other options to compel an employee to report the 
conviction.    
In addition, CBP has an additional step beyond DFW Airport’s employee vetting 
in order to allow access to the Federal Inspection Station (FIS).5  In some cases, while an 
employee may pass the requirements to receive an airport badge, he or she may fail the 
requirements of CBP’s more restrictive process and not be allowed FIS access.  The 
reason why CBP would not approve an employee to work in the FIS is privileged 
information and not readily available to the airport operator.  However, the rejection by 
CBP does not restrict the employee’s ability to work in secure areas not within the FIS.  
This fact should give airport operators pause.   
                                                 
3 Information obtained by author through databases with DFW Airport not available to the public.  
4 Ibid. 
5 The Federal Inspection Station (FIS) is the location where Customs and Border Protection receives 
and processes passengers at international airports that are arriving into the U.S. from foreign countries.   
 19
Understanding this percentage of employees that fail this additional step would 
provide a glimpse of a larger problem.  These percentages experienced at DFW Airport 
would also be of value in determining the breath of the problem within the national 
aviation system.  In addition, an opportunity to review existing procedures, which appear 
to be redundant, could provide a more robust picture of employee behaviors.   
Federal regulations govern all U.S. airports.  Therefore, all airports in the United 
States use a similar method to manage the threat presented by employees.  It is helpful to 
look beyond our nation’s borders to evaluate best practices at foreign airports in an effort 
to determine if their practices might have an application to the domestic aviation domain.  
For the purposes of benchmarking against other international airports, large Canadian 
airports were selected.  For this analysis, data was provided by the airports in Montreal 
and Toronto (Canada).   
These airports were selected for a number of reasons. First, it was important to 
find airports with a track record of success in the management of insider threats.  
Reviewing airports with documented failures would damage the creditability of the 
analysis. Secondly, it was imperative to determine if the airport had a high potential for 
insider threat and, thus, a realistic expectation that practices employed at the airport were 
necessary and effective.   
Next, the airports needed to be in a country with a similar free society.  Airports 
in communist or dictatorial societies have methods of dealing with employees that would 
not be easily applicable to the United States.  Finally, the airport must be one that would 
share information on their practices openly.  In these cases, a long and well-developed 
relationship among aviation security professionals is in place that allows for some sharing 
of sensitive information.  
Canadian airports use a methodology similar to the United States in vetting airport 
employees through the mandates of federal regulations.  There are significant differences 
in who performs the background checks and how the information is shared.  Some of the 
data that would be useful to this thesis is unavailable, since it is considered security 
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sensitive; however, the regulations are accessible and easily available allowing for 
comparative analysis between U.S. regulations and those of the Canadian government.   
C. DATA COLLECTION 
Data was collected by the author from the database at DFW Airport’s Access 
Control Office (ACO).  The ACO is the office having primary administrative 
responsibility for the collection, processing and issuance of airport identification security 
media (badge).  This is a highly complex process that integrates the identification of 
employees, fingerprinting and capturing of other relevant and required data.  Once 
captured, the ACO transmits the data to a clearinghouse where employee vetting occurs 
across multiple federal agencies.  One result of this step in the process is the return of 
criminal history derived from federal records.  This criminal history is checked for 
disqualifying crimes and a badge is issued or denied based in part on these results.  This 
data, while not normally complied in a format useful to this research, was assembled for a 
45-month period (January 2007 to September 2010). 
With regard to the Canadian regulations, the policies were available on the 
internet.  The regulations were downloaded and analyzed.   
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
Airports and airlines are required to run criminal history records checks on new 
employees prior to issuing a security badge; however, regulations do not require 
additional checks later in the employee’s career even though a security badge is typically 
renewed every two years.  DFW Airport has a practice of checking 15 percent of the 
employees renewing applications each year.  This random process provides DFW 
Airport, as a representative sample, the ability to demonstrate patterns of employees that 
have failed to meet their regulatory obligation to self-report convictions.  As such, this 
data can be presumptively extrapolated across the U.S. aviation system.  Analyzing the 
increase or decrease in the percentage of employees that failed to be approved for badge 
renewal yields an estimate of the value of these additional steps to national aviation 
security   
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In addition, employees that desire access to the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Areas, within an international airport, are required to undergo additional 
background checks by CBP.  There are occasions whereby employees will pass the 
criminal history records check conducted by airport/airline institutions but will be denied 
access to the CBP areas due to irregularities within the employee’s background that cause 
CBP to deny this privilege.  In these cases, the employee retains his/her badge but is 
assigned duties at the airport, in other secure areas but not allowed access to CBP areas. 
The method of research began with a comprehensive review of the regulations 
that govern the management of aviation employees both physically and non-physically.  
Physical measures, for the purpose of this research, are considered to be barriers, fencing, 
CCTV, and others that are designed to fortify an aviation perimeter, terminal building, or 
other support buildings, thereby denying unauthorized or unintended access to persons, 
including employees.  Non-physical measures are considered background checks, 
including security threat assessments, criminal history records checks, credit checks, and 
personal references that are designed to paint a picture of an individual’s future behavior 
based on past behaviors.  During this phase of the analysis, it became clear that physical 
measures, while an important component in the management of insider threats, the reality 
is that any measure taken to restrict entry, movement or access, could be defeated in 
complex venues such as an international airport.   
The next step in the research was a review of available literature, beyond 
regulations, to determine what methods had been implemented or tested and how the new 
methods had performed, and if additional methods were being considered for 
implementation or testing.  Based primarily on the available literature, additional physical 
measures were generally characterized as costly and easily defeated by industrious 
employees.  Therefore, the research began to focus on measures on the non-physical 
track.  The purpose was to determine if other measures to enhance existing non-physical 
measures or if new dimensions of non-physical measures could be added and thereby 
improve the current situation.   
In order to provide some measurement of the expected success of 
recommendations to increase the effectiveness of the policies under review, criteria for 
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judging the recommendations was necessary.  A matrix was created that includes the 
effectiveness, public perception, the implementation cost, and the ease of implementing 
the recommendations.    
The effectiveness of the recommendations was determined by predicting the 
number of employees that are discovered to have convictions for crimes that disqualify 
them from retaining airport security credentials.  This dimension may not be immediately 
recognizable until the recommendations are implemented; however, there is quantitative 
evidence from at least one major airport that provides data on the number of employees 
that have been convicted of a disqualifying crime following receipt of a badge.   
Public perception regarding aviation security is an important driver of many of the 
security activities performed at airports.  Currently, the average consumer of the airport is 
no doubt unaware of vulnerabilities within the current systems and methods used to 
verify employee identity and in managing the threat potential from this group over the 
course of what could be a two or three decade career.   
Any action or method proposed by this thesis will impact the employee base, not 
necessarily the public-at-large.  Other measures have been implemented since September 
11, 2001 that are specifically designed to validate employee identity and criminal history.  
While those measures are believed to fall short of a comprehensive review of employee 
behaviors, a review of the reaction from the public to those measures from the past are 
believed to be replicated in any new measures proposed in the future.   
The implementation cost criteria can be ascertained with some degree of 
accuracy.  The logistics of such enhancements are believed to be fairly easy to identify.  
Costs for recommendations will be applied to a cost-per-enplaned passenger matrix that 
will demonstrate the anticipated percentage of cost against the cost airlines/airports 
typical calculate to drive ticket prices.   
The ease of implementing the recommendations was judged based on variables to 
include push back that might be expected from the public and congress.   
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Table 1.   Matrix 
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IV. ANALYSIS/FINDINGS 
The findings from this study provide important insights for understanding of a 
complex set of security gaps associated with mitigating the aviation insider threat.  These 
findings lead toward the development of a set of recommendations that are collated into 
an easily understandable and non-distracting set of holistic changes designed to work 
within an emergent threat in a highly complex airport security environment to mitigate 
the insider threat and enhance security at U.S. airports.  
The analysis is organized in four sections.  The sections are designed to uncover 
underlying structures and processes and to demystify and clarify the current issues facing 
aviation security professionals, which will allow for a more focused understanding of the 
current degree of vulnerability and what actions should/can be taken to close the 
vulnerabilities.   
This chapter will first analyze 49 CFR 1542 and 49 CFR 1544, which are the 
federal regulations that specifically provide authority for the state, local, and private 
sector to address the insider threat.  In addition, it will outline the commonly applied 
concepts that airport and aircraft operators utilize in their attempts to satisfy the 
requirements of the regulations and more specifically to disrupt threats from aviation 
insiders.   
Next, this chapter will analyze a popular strategy that is believed to enhance the 
management of threats from aviation insiders by screening the aviation employees using 
the methods normally considered in screening passengers.  Finally, this chapter will 
identify and analyze enhancements to the current methods of managing aviation insider 
threats, as well as concepts of background checks that are common in other venues.  
Those concepts include, but are not limited to, employee behaviors such as: criminal, 
financial, and employment history. 
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A. THE CURRENT MODEL FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION 
INSIDER THREATS AND LOCAL APPLICATIONS 
The 49 CFR 1542, Airport Security, addresses the airport operator’s role in 
securing aviation.  Within 49 CFR 1542, this research focused on sections, 1542.201, 
“Security of the secured area”, 1542.205, “Security of the security identification display 
area (SIDA)”, and 1542.209, “Fingerprint-based criminal history records checks 
(CHRC)”.  These sections are directly linked to employee related matters, such as 
background checks, that have bearing on insider threats.  These sections were analyzed 
by evaluating their strengths in four areas outlined in a matrix (see table 1). Those areas 
included the overall effectiveness of the federal requirements to address the threat to 
aviation presented by insiders, the perception of an interested public as to the 
appropriateness of the measure, the cost to implement changes to the regulations, and the 
ease in implementing changes to the regulations.    
The 49 CFR 1544, Aircraft Operator Security: Air Carriers and Commercial 
Operators, addresses the air carriers and aircraft operator’s role in securing aviation.  
Within 49 CFR 1544, sections 1544.201, “Acceptance and screening of individuals and 
accessible property”, 1544.225, “Security of aircraft and facilities”, 1544.229, 
“Fingerprint-based criminal history records checks (CHRC): Unescorted access authority, 
authority to perform screening functions, and authority to perform checked baggage or 
cargo functions”, 1544.230, “Fingerprint-based criminal history records checks (CHRC): 
Flight crew members” were also analyzed and mapped against the insider threat matrix.     
Currently, the threat from attack by an aviation insider is managed by various 
stakeholders that include federal, state, and local officials.  Likewise, private sector 
having employees working in secure areas also have a stake in the management of the 
insider threat.  Although various stakeholders have an interest, the primary portion of this 
shared responsibility lies with the airport operator.  
Airport operators have primary responsibility for the physical security of the 
secure areas of the airport.  Typically, airport operators deploy physical measures that are 
utilized to deny entry to secure areas of the airport by those not authorized to enter.  
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Those physical measures take the form of gates, fences, locks, and other traditional 
security devices.  In addition, airport operators typically hire security officers to maintain 
the integrity of security at certain points where more positive control and identification 
are necessary.  Airport operators are also the primary entity that issues airport 
identification to employees authorizing access to the secure areas.   
B. THE BADGING PROCESS 
Assuming employees have authorization to enter the secure areas through the 
physical measures: the first line of defense to managing aviation insiders is through the 
issuances of airport identification (badge) to employees to allow access.  While the badge 
is a visible, outward symbol allowing for immediate recognition of an employee’s 
authority to enter secure areas of the airport, the real value of the badge lies behind what 
is not outwardly visible.  This value is in the badge application process that leads up to 
the issuance of the badge.   
The badging process is a highly regulated (49 CFR 1542. 209), complicated, 
multi-step process that can become protracted.  It begins with an authority, the badge 
sponsor, who is generally the employer who must sign a document verifying that the 
employee is in need of a badge.  The next step is for the employee to verify his identity 
that he is in fact, the person who is being sponsored for the badge.  This verification 
requires two forms of identification, including at least one photo ID.  
Following verification of identity, fingerprints are captured for the purpose of 
completing a fingerprint based criminal history records check (CHRC).  Airport 
operators, under 49 CFR 1542.209, have the authority and the requirement to conduct a 
CHRC.  Aircraft operators are permitted this same authority and are required, to conduct 
a CHRC under the 49 CFR 1544.229. 
Employees or applicants that have a criminal history for one of 28 disqualifying 
crimes (49 CFR 1542. 209d) are automatically disqualified from the ability to have 
unescorted access to secure airport areas by virtue of not being issued the requisite badge 
(see appendix A).  In addition, a security threat assessment (STA) is completed on each 
employee by the federal government.  The exact steps within the STA are classified, but 
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it is well known that names of individual employees are checked against a range of 
federally managed lists.  Having employee’s names on one of these lists, such as the “No-
Fly list”, is sufficient for a denial of the employee for badging until such time as the issue 
is resolved.  Once all the steps are complete, in approximately two to three weeks, the 
badge is presented to the employee.   
C. STRENGTHS BUILT INTO THE PROCESS 
The badging program has some significant strengths that makes this method of 
management of the insider threat a viable tactic.  First and foremost, the badging process 
places strong emphasis on determining and verifying the identity of the individuals 
presenting for a badge.  This is a linchpin step, which without the confidence that a 
person applying for the badge is legitimate, would make the remaining steps ineffective.  
Two forms of identification, one government issued and one including a photo, provides 
a heightened degree of confidence that the subject presenting for a badge is, in fact, the 
person who is pictured in the ID.   
Second to positive identification of a subject, the finger-print based criminal 
history records check (CHRC) is the most valuable step.  This strength is founded in two 
aspects.  One positive attribute of the CHRC is that is adds additional vetting of the 
employee’s identity.  Certainly, having a fingerprint to further identify an individual is 
the panacea of identification verification.  The other positive attribute of the CHRC is the 
ability to review the individual’s past criminal history for both disqualifying crimes, as 
mentioned earlier, or for patterns of criminal misbehavior.  These patterns of behaviors   
may or may not indicate a pattern of behaviors rising to the level of disqualifying 
offenses, but may demonstrate a threat to aviation cumulatively.   
The third strength to the current badging process is the security threat assessment.  
The STA is purportedly completed on a perpetual basis.  In other words, the names of 
employees that are being issued a badge, or that are in possession of a badge, are checked 
in real time in an active way.  A variety of federally managed lists containing names of 
known or suspected terrorist or criminals are pinged perpetually. If an employee’s name 
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appears on one of these lists, it allows law enforcement personnel to take proactive action 
to detain/arrest or otherwise remove the threat from the secure aviation environment.    
D. WEAKNESS IN THE PROCESS 
Unfortunately, the badging process is not without its shortcomings or weaknesses.  
One such weakness lies in the ability to verify a person’s Identity with 100 percent 
confidence.  Forms of identification are required by federal statue in order to prove 
identity and to begin the badging process.  As there is no single, universal form of 
identity, federal guidance specifics what forms of identification are acceptable to prove 
identity and to establish authority for an individual to be employed. This guidance is 
attached to this report (see Appendix B).  
In some cases, certain forms of identification can serve to both positively identify 
the individual and as proof of employment status.  Such documents include a U.S. 
passport or other forms of alien registration cards. An alternative for those that do not 
have a passport or other alien registration authority is that they are required to produce 
two forms of identification.  Most commonly, U.S. citizens will present a drivers license 
or ID card and a social security card.  Other acceptable forms of identification include a 
school ID card with photograph or a voter registration card.  Approved identification 
must be issued by a government authority, and one of the identifications must have a 
photo of the individual.  This level of identification for access to areas of security in the 
airport environment are easily reproduced and thus an area of concern. 
Fingerprints were highlighted earlier in this chapter as being highly reliable as a 
form of identification.  Naturally, for this step to add this value, the individual’s 
fingerprint must be on file with law enforcement to match the individual with the 
fingerprint.  This is not always the case, and as such, fingerprint identification has it 
limits.  
Fingerprint-based CHRC also adds value by determining the past criminal history 
of an employee.  While criminal history cannot predict the future, past behaviors provide 
a measurement of an individual’s ability to abide by the law; however, this step is only of  
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value if the individual has been arrested or otherwise has a criminal history.  It is not safe 
to assume that an individual is not a criminal or terrorist risk to aviation based on the 
absence of a criminal history.  
Individuals convicted of one of the disqualifying crimes, in the past 10 years, are 
automatically denied a badge; however, an automatic denial is only relevant for 
convictions.  Criminal history that indicates a prior arrest for acts of terrorism, absent a 
conviction, on its own merit, would not automatically create a denial for a badge.  In this 
case, a review would be conducted by the appropriate authority to determine if other 
mitigating circumstances could either allow a badge to be provided to the individual or 
with-held.   
In addition, there is the possibility that an individual, having only lived in the U.S. 
for a short period or other country that law enforcement does not have a good criminal 
information sharing network, might apply for a badge.  For example, an individual, who 
has recently immigrated to the U.S. from a country that has known ties to terrorist 
organizations, could apply for a badge.  In this case, it is unlikely that U.S. law 
enforcement would be able to, with any confidence, gather criminal history information 
from an unfriendly country.  This inability to look back with confidence at an 
individual’s criminal patterns presents a significant blind spot for decision makers 
responsible for issuing badges.   
One additional weakness associated with the CHRC is the split responsibility of 
the decision-making process between the airport operator and the aircraft operator.  As 
previously stated, all applicants are required to undergo a thorough CHRC when they 
apply for airport identification.   
In addition to specifying the crimes that would disqualify an applicant from 
receiving a badge, Federal Regulation 49 CFR 1542.209(n) also allows the airport 
operator to not grant a badge based on other mitigating circumstances.  For example, the 
list of disqualifying crimes does not include possession of a controlled substance; 
however, an airport operator can deny access to an applicant with a possession charge on 
their CHRC.  The operator is authorized to use his/her judgment to deny the badge if he 
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or she has concerns that the applicant’s past history could negatively impact airport 
security.  In these border-line cases, an airport operator may interview the employee to 
gain additional knowledge about his or her past and then make a decision based on the 
merits of the interview.  At one U.S. airport, Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, this 
decision making and interview process is carried out by a trained police detective.   
Aircraft operators that hire under 49 CFR 1544 (air carriers) are given the same 
opportunity to accept or reject applicants based on criminal history or other mitigating 
circumstances.  However, it presents numerous conflicts of interest for private companies 
to have the ability to override security practices that might conflict with their business 
interests.  Recall that U.S. Congress removed the responsibility from private airlines to 
perform passenger screenings following the tragic events of September 11, 2001.  This 
should cause one to pause and ask if this might be a conflict of interest.   
The airline/private sector is responsible for conducting the criminal history 
screenings for over 15,000 of the 28,750 badged employees at DFW.6  This is a 
significant percentage of the entire employee base.  It should be noted that at no time 
does a trained police detective, as an agent of the airport operator, have the opportunity to 
review the airline employee’s CHRC.   
Another significant weakness of the badging process is the absence of follow 
through after the issuance of a badge.  Typically, badges are considered valid for a two-
year period.  Once the badge expires, the employee is required to resubmit for a badge 
renewal.   
There is no federal requirement to verify that during the period an employee is 
badged, he/she has not committed and been convicted of additional crimes.  There is a 
requirement, 49 CFR 1542.209(e), for employees to self-report convictions of any of the 
disqualifying criminal offenses within 24 hours of the conviction.  This requirement is 
unrealistic considering that employees reporting a conviction of one of the disqualifying 
crimes would lose their privilege to have a badge or unescorted access and would most 
likely have their employment terminated.  There is very little, if any, incentive for an 
                                                 
6 Information obtained by author through databases with DFW Airport not available to the public. 
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employee to report a conviction of a disqualifying criminal offense or any other crimes 
that might be useful to the airport operator/aircraft operator in being able to connect the 
dots on employee behavior and the potential for an insider threat.   
The fact that some employees will be convicted of crimes following the issuances 
of a badge should not be a question.  The question might be how large of a problem is 
this reality.  Anecdotal data was collected from one major airport.  During a three year 
period (fiscal year 2007–2009), DFW Airport checked CHRC for employees that 
renewed badges.  The CHRC was limited to only 15 percent of all the badges that were 
expired and requesting renewal.   Therefore, of the 24,364 incumbent employees that 
requested a badge to be renewed; only 6,777 were submitted for an updated CHRC.7  Of 
the 6,777 incumbent employees submitted from CHRC, six (one percent) were 
disqualified from badge renewal based on the results of the CHRC.  Applying that same 
data across the total of employees requesting a badge renewal, another 16 employees 
would have been disqualified.  While this percentage of employees, when characterized 
in percentages may appear to be low, the fact that 16 employees could continue to 
possess badges, and thus access to the secure aviation areas of the airport, is 
disconcerting.   
It is also important to remember that the only other method currently in place to 
identify an employee with a conviction subsequent to employment is through the 
employee self-reporting the conviction.  Equally concerning is the fact that an arrest for 
one of the criminal offenses or any other offense would not create a requirement to self-
report, only a conviction.  This is discussed in more detail later in this thesis. 
Some might contend that the STA, conducted on a perpetual basis, is a back stop 
to such behavior that might signal officials to the presence of a criminal offense.  
However, as recently demonstrated with the Christmas Day attack on aviation in Detroit 
(2009), this assessment is a valuable tool but has weaknesses within its applications.  
Furthermore, criminal offenses on their own would not necessarily cause an individual’s 
name to be added to any of the various lists designed to target potential terrorist.   
                                                 
7 Information obtained by author through databases with DFW Airport not available to the public. 
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Moreover, the finger print based criminal history portion of the badging process is 
limited to criminal behaviors only.  Other common behaviors are frequently included in 
background investigations.  Background investigations frequently include aspects of a 
person’s behavior that might, on their own, not indicate a propensity to be a threat to 
aviation but when looked at as a piece of the whole, might raise suspicion with a trained 
investigator.  Those other elements could include aspects such as having traveled to areas 
considered to be bastions for terrorist, having acquaintances or family ties with known 
felons, and credit history with questionable history or bankruptcy.  Any one of these, or 
all of these in a person’s past, do not mean the individual is a risk to aviation, but the 
presence in an individual’s background could be a precursor to that risk and worthy of 
interview to assess the risk and to monitor an individual’s behavior following the receipt 
of a badge.   
E. PROPOSED METHOD TO MANAGE AVIATION INSIDER THREAT—
100 PERCENT EMPLOYEE SCREENING  
The consequences of an attack perpetrated by an aviation insider could be 
disastrous and monumental.  An insider (employee) could simply carry a weapon into the 
restricted area and provide an individual or groups of perpetrators with weapons on the 
sterile side of the airport after they have been processed by TSA passenger screeners.  
Once inside the sterile area, the armed perpetrators would have no additional security 
scrutiny prior to boarding an aircraft.  Other means of sabotage could also occur such as 
placing explosives on aircraft in the cargo holds, damaging flight control or propulsion 
systems, or secreting other individuals through employee portals undetected.  As such, 
much thought has been given to attempt to eliminate the threat. 
Congress, the media, and other groups have expressed concern at the current 
system.  One solution proposed by individuals within congress is 100 percent employee 
screening.  One hundred percent employee screening is defined by the Congressional 
Committee on Homeland Security in a report directing the Assistant Security of DHS to 
address vulnerabilities in aviation security by carrying out a pilot program to screen 
airport workers.  In this report, 100 percent employee screening is described as 
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application “of the same standards as apply to passengers at airport security screening 
checkpoints” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007).  Individual Congressmen have 
threatened 100 percent employee screening as a mandated and regulated solution to the 
dilemma.  In some cases, a pilot program for 100 percent employee screening was 
conducted at several U.S. airports (U.S. House of Representatives, 2007).  The 
Government Accountability Office (GOA) has indicated that current forms of 100 
percent employee screening are not practical or realistic.  The cost of such a solution 
would be extraordinary and, in some cases, put commercial airlines out of business.  
Likewise, the notion that airports could realistically screen their entire population of 
employees with over 100 percent effectiveness during the course of the working day is 
impossible to achieve.  Any fixed system, process, or procedure, such as 100 percent 
employee screening, will just be another measure that the highly adaptive insider will 
learn to manipulate.  Once employees learn the process, those that would inflict harm, 
will learn ways to defeat the screening process.   
Airports and other critical infrastructure that have miles of secure perimeter to 
protect, all have similar vulnerabilities.  If an employee is required to go through a 
screening checkpoint as he/she arrives at work, there is not a measure in place or 
currently feasible to deny an insider from driving or walking to a remote location on the 
secure perimeter and passing weapons or other dangerous items over, under or through 
the perimeter fence.  The screening of 100 percent of the employees only determines if 
they have authorization to be in the restricted area and if they are free of weapons, 
explosive devices, or prohibited items at the point they are screened.  A multitude of 
other opportunities to acquire contraband are available to an insider following screening.  
There is not a system that is capable of determining whether they are friend or foe.   
Given that insiders are quick to learn how to work around any system that may be 
put into place; a more sophisticated approach is in order.  For an approach to be effective 
at detecting and deterring an insider, it must be a dynamic system that is based on varying 
levels of security in a layered fashion, executed in a random manner (Elias, 2009)   
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F. ENHANCING CURRENT MEASURES TO DECREASE THE INSIDER 
THREAT TO AVIATION 
The current system for employee vetting is foundationally solid.  No one has the 
ability to see into the future or into the mind of a person that is scheming to do ill will; 
however, certain patterns of behavior can be a precursor indicating a person’s willingness 
to act outside of the law.  This behavioral pattern recognition is the strategy employed by 
aviation security professionals as they attempt to provide access to restricted areas of an 
airport to those that would contribute to aviation through employment and deny those that 
have patterns of behavior that cause an authority to question a person’s motives for 
access to restricted areas.  A review of an individual’s criminal past (CHRC) is a 
historical, behavioral review; however, there are additional measures and steps that can 
be built upon or shored up to this foundation. 
G. CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS CHECKS—FREQUENCY 
An individual is required to have a CHRC completed before they are issued their 
original badge.  While the badge is typically valid for a predetermined timeframe (most 
airport authorities use a two year time frame), the employee is not required to have an 
additional CHRC completed when his/her badge is renewed.  Therefore, this creates 
blindness for aviation security professionals as they have no built in measures to track an 
employee’s criminal behavior over time.  There is a requirement for employees to self-
report a conviction of one of the disqualifying crimes but that measure is not effective 
and will be discussed in greater detail as this narrative progresses.  The frequency of a 
CHRC is an area for consideration. 
H. EMPLOYEE SELF REPORTING CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS OF A 
DISQUALIFYING CRIME 
As indicated earlier, an employee that has been convicted of one of the 
disqualifying crimes is required to self-report the conviction within 24 hours of the 
conviction to the employer or airport operator.  This requirement is deeply flawed for 
several reasons.   
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First, there is no obligation for an employee to report being arrested or charged 
for any crime.  Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that an employee that has been 
arrested of one of the disqualifying crimes will not report the arrest leaving the airport 
operator without this critical piece of intelligence.   
Furthermore, it is reasonable to think that since a secondary or subsequent CHRC 
is not required once the initial CHRC is completed prior to employment. Moreover, since 
there is not an automated or likely means for the employee arrest or conviction to come to 
the airport operator’s attention, unless the employee volunteers this career ending 
information, that employee could maintain his/her employment long term without the 
airport operator’s awareness.  This would mean that a high risk individual could have 
unescorted access to the restricted areas of an airport.   
Under the current regulations, criminal prosecution or fines are not likely.  As 
such, combined with the fact the a CHRC is not required following the initial CHRC, the 
risk to the employee is greater for following the rules as opposed to keeping the 
conviction a secret.   
I. REQUIREMENT TO REPORT ARREST—NOT JUST CONVICTIONS 
Another helpful piece of evidence that is not available in every case to the 
aviation security professional is the presence of arrests related to a CHRC.  The 
disqualifying crimes prohibit the unescorted access of individual’s that have been 
convicted; however, there is no obligation for an employee to report any arrest to the 
airport operator.  The only requirement is to report a conviction of one of the 
disqualifying crimes.  Under the legal system, charges get reduced, adjudicated, or at a 
minimum, take months and years to litigate.  For these reasons, it is important to an 
aviation security professional’s awareness that all arrests are reported and considered into 
the approval process of unescorted access.   
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have some similar duties and 
authorities as it relates to aviation security and access to CBP security areas at airports 
(19 CFR 122.187).  Under this law, CBP has grounds to revoke or suspend access to its 
secure airport area if the employee has been arrested for, or charged with an offense listed 
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in Sec. 122.183 (a) (4) and prosecution or other disposition of the arrest or charge is 
pending.  This measure provided to the CBP Port Director allows him/her the ability to 
act on intelligence that might be detrimental to the integrity of the CBP security area in 
the best interest of safety and security before final legal measures are complete.   
J. LIMITATIONS ON DEPTH OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS 
CHECKS—10 YEARS 
Another blind spot in the CHRC is the requirement to consider an individual’s 
criminal history for a period of 10 years.  While an argument could be made to consider 
the individual’s entire criminal history for the purposes of issuing an airport badge, the 
more serious concern is the inability to inspect all individual’s criminal history over that 
10 year period. Aviation security professionals are blinded by crimes that are committed 
by an individual as either a juvenile or if they have immigrated to the United States 
during that 10 year period.   
Individuals who immigrate to the United States legally are not prohibited from 
receiving an airport identification badge and having access to secure areas.  Therefore, an 
individual that has committed crimes in another country may not be discovered to have 
those criminal convictions.  
Juvenile criminal records are protected from this review in the interest of not 
burdening adults with the transgressions of their youth.  However, in the case of an 18 
year old airport employee, this is another significant blind spot for aviation security 
professionals in determining the character of those that would be granted unescorted 
access to secure airport areas.  This will be discussed in greater detail later in the section 
on Juvenile criminal history.   
K. AIR CARRIER (PRIVATE SECTOR) AUTHORITIES  
Another measure in place, under the authority of 49 CFR 1544, allows airlines 
(private sector) to be the sole consumer of the individual’s CHRC once it has been 
completed.  In this case, the aviation security professional at the airport authority is not 
allowed to review the criminal history.  This allows the private airlines with a primary 
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interest in the profit of the company to be in conflict with making a decision on 
unescorted access and profit margins or other interests.  The activity of reviewing CHRC 
of employees has been split between the airport operator and the aircraft operator.  
L. MEASURES COMMONLY USED OUTSIDE OF THE AVIATION 
ENVIRONMENT THAT MAY BE TRANSFERABLE TO FURTHER 
DISRUPT THREATS FROM INSIDERS 
Beyond simply checking an employee’s criminal history for patterns of criminal 
behavior, other checks have the ability to demonstrate behaviors that might indicate an 
employee’s susceptibility to behave outside the law.  Those commonly utilized checks 
include a review of credit history, employment history, personal references, travel 
behaviors, driving records, Psychological evaluation, and Juvenile Criminal History 
1. Credit History 
One commonly reviewed and immediately valued measure is a personal credit 
history review. Credit checks are easily attainable and low cost.  Among other virtues, a 
credit check can assist in providing additional confidence in the individual’s identity.  
While it is possible to possess fraudulent identification documentation, backing up that 
identity with a history of credit or spending behaviors is more difficult to quickly 
produce.  This adds value to verifying the identity of the individual.   
Also, a credit check can provide intelligence on an individual’s financial well 
being.  While bankruptcy and other financial challenges do not at face value indicate a 
person is or could have criminal intentions, it can be one more indication of an 
individual’s desperation.  A history of bankruptcy and mounting debt, combined with an 
individual’s criminal history and/or other key indicators, could provide a trained aviation 
professional the data necessary to deny a badge—or at least monitor the employee 
carefully if the badge was provided.   
2. Employment History 
Another source of intelligence that can be added to the review of an individual for 
potential access to secure areas of an airport is employment history.  Reviewing an 
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individual’s employment history over a period of time can reveal behaviors in work place 
settings that can likely be duplicated in the new work place environment at the airport.  
Disciplinary actions, terminations, or other actions in employees are indicators of 
behavioral patterns.  Here again, on their own and without sufficient data from other 
information streams, the behaviors may not be indicative of an individual’s propensity to 
act outside of the law.  Even so, combined with other key indicators that are readily 
available to an aviation security professional, patterns could emerge that are actionable.   
3. Personal References 
Another easily accessible source of intelligence on individuals is personal 
references.  Personal references sometimes referred to as character reference check allow 
for those with a more intimate knowledge of the individual to provide insights into the 
integrity of the individual.  While it may be easy to find someone that will provide 
informal testimony on an individual’s character, even sometimes fraudulently, this step 
forces an individual to identify persons inside the individual’s inner circle of colleagues, 
friends, and associates.  These known associates each come with their own background 
and behavioral patterns that, on their own, may serve to tip the aviation security 
professional to question the associations and the company the individual keeps.   
4. Travel Behaviors 
Another useful piece of information that can assist the aviation security 
professional in determining whether to grant unescorted airport access to an individual is 
the individual’s travel patterns.  Specifically, documentation demonstrating an 
individual’s travel history, including international locations that are otherwise regarded as 
unfriendly towards the U.S. and with a history or harboring, aiding or funding terrorist 
organizations.  The mere fact that a person travels to such an unfriendly country on its 
own would not be a red flag and cause a badge to not be issued but it might be one of 
many yellow flags that cumulatively would cause an aviation security professional to 
deny unescorted access.   
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5. Driving Record 
A person’s driving record is another source of identification and intelligence.  
Here again, while acquiring fraudulent identification is somewhat easy today, having a 
driving history is not attainable in a matter of days but is acquired over a lifetime.  
Granted, not everyone has a driver’s license, and, for this reason and others, it is not 
regarded as the final authority on identity or criminal behavior patterns but it is another 
valuable piece of information in comprising an individual’s behavior profile.   
On a related note, employee’s that operate motor vehicles on the aircraft 
movement area are not typically required by local laws to have a valid driver’s license. 
However, in the interest of aircraft safety having individuals operating motor vehicles 
that have questionable driving records, in and around aircraft on the secure side of an 
airport is not a good practice.  Thus, an additional benefit of checking an employee’s 
driving record could improve safety on the airport in the aircraft movement area.  
6. Psychological Evaluation 
Psychological evaluation is another measure used by employers who are 
processing applicants for sensitive jobs.  Applicants may be required to submit to a 
psychological evaluation before they can be employed.  A psychological evaluation or 
mental examination is an examination into a person's mental health by a mental health 
professional, such as a psychologist. A psychological evaluation may result in a diagnosis 
of a mental illness. It is the mental equivalent of a physical examination and can provide 
additional intelligence into the overall picture of an individual, including potential for 
perpetrating violence.   
7. Juvenile Criminal History 
Finally, criminal history is not inclusive of crimes committed as a juvenile.  This 
blind spot could be problematic for aviation security professionals as airports are 
employers of many young employees.  Currently, the law does not allow the aviation 
security professional access to an individual’s criminal history if the crime was 
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committed before his or her eighteenth birthday. Therefore, it is plausible that a person 
could have been convicted of one of the disqualifying crimes before 18 years of age and 
subsequently applied for unescorted access to restricted areas of an airport at age 20.  In 
this case, the aviation security professional would be unaware of this conviction without 
the individual volunteering the information that would restrict employment.   
Clearly, the vast majority of perpetrators of terrorism are young men.  Therefore, 
while the regulation allows an aviation security professional to consider the last 10 years 
of criminal history, a 20 year old individual would only have two years of data available 
for consideration.   
M. CONCLUSION 
The suspected problems and security vulnerabilities were known by this 
researcher but considered out of personal control or influence to have a positive impact 
on the national problem.  However, it occurred that the problem while known by many 
aviation security professionals, the complexities of the problem made it difficult to 
exquisitely and cumulatively articulate.  Therefore, the typical reaction was to discuss or 
approach the problem in small bites.  However, as suggestions are made to add steps or 
refine processes to further reduce the vulnerability, critics are quick to point out the 
imperfections within the suggestions.  The result is a paralysis among aviation security 
professionals.   
This research does not intend to provide the perfect solution to eliminate the 
vulnerability.  The fact remains, that predicting the future of an individual’s behavior 
criminal intent is not feasible, possible, or likely.  That being the case, this research 
analysis’s current methods, looks for new innovations or steps to enhance the ability to 
manage the threat presented by aviation insiders.  This author believes that enhancements 
to the current method of managing insider threat has been inhibited by the general 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSION 
Based on the findings of the previous chapter, a number of specific 
recommendations are presented in this chapter, which seeks to mitigate the insider threat 
to aviation security.  Recommendations that promise to produce the most significant 
impact on mitigating the insider threat, after balancing them against the criteria, including 
effectiveness, public perception, the cost, and ease to implement, will be summarized in 
this chapter.   
In the previous chapter, it was determined that the current process to vet a 
potential employee’s background had significant value that should be leveraged and 
enhanced.  Furthermore, it was determined that additional enhancements such as a review 
of credit history, employment history, and travel patterns, would strengthen the current 
methodology.  Each of these additional recommendations will be discussed and evaluated 
in the following sections. 
A. THE BADGING PROCESS 
Six specific areas within the current badging process were reviewed: positive 
identification, CHRC, self-reporting criminal convictions, reporting of arrest, the depth of 
CHRC, and air carrier authority.  It was determined that each area contains opportunities 
to further enhance existing processes that would deny access to those within the aviation 
employee group to secure areas based on past behaviors.   
1. Positive Identification  
Accessing the effectiveness of an airport security badging process begins with 
establishing whether an employee is legitimate.  Absence proof and confidence that the 
employee/applicant is actually providing his/her actual identity, everything that follows 
in the badging process is likely to be ineffective in mitigating, in part, the insider threat.  
In evaluating the current requirements under federal law for proof of identity, 
there are some noteworthy gaps.  Under the list of documents acceptable for proof of 
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identity are a school ID card with a photograph and a voter’s registration card.  These 
documents are either easily attained through fraudulent means or easily reproduced.  In 
addition, this same federal requirement allows individuals under the age of 18 to present 
documentation as a means for identification to include a school record or report card, a 
clinic, doctor or hospital record, or a day-care.  Here again the reliability of these 
documents are unquestionably inadequate as a means to prove identity for the purposes of 
getting access to secure areas of U.S. airports.  It is difficult to imagine that a U.S. airport 
could potentially allow an employee/applicant to produce a nursery school record as a 
form of identification.   
Other forms of identification used to verify an employee/applicants identity are 
more traditional, mainstream, and less likely to be reproduced fraudulently.  Those 
include driver’s licenses and ID cards issued by government agencies; such as, military 
ID cards. 
School ID cards, voter’s registration cards, school records, report cards, 
clinic/doctor/hospital records and day-care nursery school records should be eliminated 
from the federal requirements.  Elimination of the low quality forms of identification 
would increase the effectiveness of the employee/applicant vetting process.  Requiring 
higher quality identification is an enhancement that would be readily accepted by the 
main stream public, would not increase operational cost to aviation, and would be easily 
implemented.  Therefore, this measure will appear as a recommend of this research. 
2. Criminal History Records Checks – Increasing Frequency 
The current requirement to conduct a CHRC at the beginning of an 
employee/applicants career at a U.S. airport is a cost effective and accepted baseline 
measure in evaluating an employee’s past behavior as a measure to predict future 
behaviors.  However, failure to require a continued review of an incumbent employee’s 
criminal behavior over the course of what is commonly a multi-decade career is grossly 




requires an employee to renew their badge on a two-year interval, this seems to be the 
ideal time to conduct a follow up CHRC to verify the employee has not been convicted of 
a criminal offense during this same period of time.   
This measure has shown anecdotal evidence of value from partial implementation 
at DFW airport mentioned earlier; however, it is not without cost to conduct this 
additional measure.  At a minimum, this cost would include a submission fee currently 
collected by the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE).  The current cost 
to perform this additional check beyond the initial CHRC would be a minimum cost of 
$27 per badge for the AAAE to receive the request, process it through the FBI, and return 
the results to the requesting airport.  This is additional cost, when considered against the 
fact that there are thousands of employees working at U.S. airports that would be 
included in this enhanced measure, the cost would be significant.  For instance, DFW 
Airport renews approximately 11,000 badges annually.8  This cost would be 
approximately $300,000 for just this one airport; however, the cost would typically be 
passed on to the badge holder or company sponsoring the individuals’ unescorted access.   
There is other incidental costs that are specific based on local capacity in 
determining the overall cost of this enhancement.  This additional step in the badging 
process would no doubt increase wait times for badge renewals as the CHRC is run 
through the formal channels.  It could increase headcount for employees in the badging 
office in order to keep pace with the demands that would result from the additional step.   
Despite the significant cost that would likely result from this enhancement, the 
additional situational awareness gained from a CHRC is not possible to attain through 
another measure.  Increasing frequency of the CHRC to every two years is a proven, 
effective measure, would be easily implemented and would have broad public support.  
Regardless of the cost to execute this enhancement, this measure is believed to be a 
valuable step and will therefore appear as a recommendation from this research.   
                                                 
8 Information obtained by author through databases with DFW Airport not available to the public. 
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3. Self Reporting Criminal Convictions—Incentivizing  
There are currently no incentives for employees to self-report criminal 
convictions of a disqualifying crime as required by federal law.  Self-reporting such a fact 
would likely end an aviation employee’s career at U.S. airports. While the federal 
requirement is explicit that an employee is required to report the conviction within 24 
hours, it is unlikely this would be the case.   
Therefore, it is essential that regulators take steps to hold individuals accountable 
for failing to report such convictions.  In addition to criminal prosecution for failing to 
self-report, a civil process should be exploited to fine the individual for the failing.  These 
additional measures should be implemented to hold the individual employee accountable 
for failing to self-report but also sends a message to the balance of aviation employees 
that failing to following the requirements results in harsh consequences both criminally 
and financially.   
This measure has an increasing value if the recommendation to increasing the 
frequency of the CHRC is not adopted.  This increased frequency would serve to uncover 
employees that have failed to self-report. Two areas of improvement are in order to 
minimize this vulnerability.  First, rechecking an employee’s CHRC every 2 years would 
provide an automated means to bring the employee’s behavior to the attention of the 
airport operator.  Second, imposing financial and criminal sanctions on employees that 
fail to self-report would provide incentives for employees to report the convictions before 
they were found out during the normal CHRC process and limit further their criminal and 
financial liability.   
This measure would improve the overall effectiveness of the process, be widely 
understood and accepted by the public, be easy to implement.  Fines can help offset the 
cost to litigate the measure.  For these reasons this measure will be included in the 
recommendations.   
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4. Reporting of Arrest—Not Just Convictions 
While the requirement to self-report criminal convictions for disqualifying 
criminal offenses is a step in the right direction, the fact is this is only a small step in 
improving an airport operator’s situational awareness of an employee’s criminal 
behaviors.  In today’s world, individuals are arrested only to commonly have the charges 
dropped, deferred, or otherwise reduced.  In addition, the legal process is a time 
consuming process, particularly in the arena of criminal prosecution.   
That being the case, airport operators are operating under a false sense of security 
if they are unable to have the full benefit of an employee’s criminal activities regardless 
if they are alleged for not.  While an arrest on its own is not normally sufficient 
information for an airport operator to terminate an employee’s employment, it would, in 
many cases, provide the airport operator with more timely information that might cause 
an employee to be reassigned to less security sensitive activities, pending disposition of 
the charge.  In addition, multi-arrests, regardless of convictions, would warrant a review 
of the employee’s access rights and, subsequently, a reassessment of those access rights.   
Requiring employees to self-report arrest, not just convictions for disqualifying 
criminal offenses, is complementary to increasing frequency of the CHRC to a two-year 
interval and to the measure to incentivizing self-reporting of convictions.  If an employee 
has confidence his/her behavior will be disclosed automatically at some interval, during 
the badge renewal process, and is aware that additional criminal and financial 
consequences are likely to occur if he or she fails to abide by the requirement, his/her 
likelihood of self-reporting the arrest is dramatically increased.   
It is also noteworthy that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection has a similar 
requirement to report arrest within a 24-hour period for access to the secure areas of 
international airports in the areas they control (Federal Inspection Stations).  For the same 
reason, this provision is available to the CBP Port Directors at airports, this authority 
should be added to the tools available to the airport operator.   
This enhancement to the current methods within the federal requirements would 
require an employee to self-report arrests and as such, would increase the effectiveness of 
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the measure, would not be an additional expense, it is easy to implement, and would be 
regarded by the public as an appropriate measure for employees working in a secure 
aviation environment.   
5. Depth of Criminal History Records Checks—10 Years 
As discussed previously, the requirement that disqualifies an employee/applicant 
from unescorted access to secure areas of an airport based on criminal convictions for a 
disqualifying crime in the last 10 years is reasonable, prudent, and actionable; however, 
this requirement assumes the crime history is easily attainable.  This is the case for most 
U.S. citizens or individuals that have lived in the U.S. or a country with friendly ties to 
the U.S. for the last 10 years.  However, this is not the case of employee/applicants that 
are from countries that do not share information with U.S. law enforcement readily.  In 
these cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine an individual’s criminal 
background with the same degree of confidence.  As such, a policy revision that 
recognizes this inability to gather actionable information is necessary.  A more robust 
investigation is warranted and the policy should reflect narrative to reconcile the inability 
to verify information for the full 10-year term.   
In addition, consideration should be given to allow aviation security professionals 
the authority to consider juvenile crimes in the issuances on an airport identification 
badge.  The policy should have requirements such as:  
• Verifiable 10 years of history 
• Must be U.S. citizen for 10 years, or,  
• Must have lived in a country that will share criminal data during 
the 10 year period, or,  
• Include juvenile history for employees 27 or younger.   
6. Eliminating Air Carrier (Private Sector) Authorities 
Forty-nine CFR 1544 currently allows air carriers, under certain conditions, to be 
the consumer of CHRC for their individual employees/applicants.  This authority allows 
air carriers to review CHRC and make employment decisions based on the employee’s 
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criminal past.  With many different air carriers allowed this authority is it unclear how 
they apply the authority.  Where employers under the federal requirement are allowed to 
make judgments on the potential employee/applicant threats to aviation based on this 
review, they hardly seem objective enough to make this judgment when dealing with 
their own employees.  The airport operator is left without situation awareness as to the 
criteria applied by the air carriers in making that decision.   
It is more efficient and effective to have the process of reviewing an 
employee/applicant’s CHRC in a consolidated fashion by the airport operator in concert 
with local law enforcement.  This consolidation under the airport operator provides for a 
higher degree of situational awareness across the full spectrum of employees working at 
an airport in order to more effectively manage the aviation security and the risks of 
aviation insiders.   
The process of employee badging is not increased in steps due to the air carrier 
involvement in the CHRC step, this single step is merely completed by the air carrier 
instead of the airport operator.  However, there may be incremental additional cost 
involved in implementing this measure through consolidation.  Air carriers pick up some 
savings internally by completing this step, although it is not completely clear how much.  
Even so, the cost savings, when balanced against the air carrier cost to staff up in order to 
complete the internal review, is not considered to be significant.  
Regardless of the actual cost to implement this measure, the overall effectiveness 
of the badging process in total is considered to be very significant.  In addition, the 
implementation of the measure is considered to be easy to implement and the public 
perspective is expected to be highly favorable for such a policy revision. 
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Position ID High Favorable Low Easy 
CHRC Frequency High Favorable High Easy 
Self Report High Favorable Low Easy 
Report Arrest High Favorable Low Easy 
CHRC Depth High Favorable Low Easy 
CFR 1544 High Favorable High Difficult 
B. ADDITIONAL MEASURES BEYOND CRIMINAL BEHAVIORS 
The review of an individual’s crime behaviors is probably one of the most reliable 
methods to determine the potential for an employee to act outside of the confines of the 
law in the future. (Bartal & Bartal, 2007); however, there are other evaluations that 
present opportunities to evaluate an individual’s behavioral patterns.  Other types of 
evaluations, such as personal credit history, employment history, personal references, 
travel patterns, driver’s license records, and psychological evaluation, are common in 
some preemployment settings when an individual applies for a position that requires a 
certain amount of confidence in the individual’s integrity. The other evaluations types 
will be discussed and evaluated using the criteria mentioned in Table 3.  
1. Credit History 
An individual’s credit history is commonly used in determining employability.  
An individual’s financial health is one indicator that the individual is responsible in 
addressing his or her financial obligations.  From a security perspective, the presence of 
derogatory financial data, or in more extreme cases bankruptcy, may lead to desperation 
and illegal activities to overcome the financial deficiency.    
Credit histories are easily attainable through commercial services for a nominal 
fee.  Public perception is favorable for such a measure given the common utilization.  In 
addition, the ease of implementation and the effectiveness of the measure, when 
combined with other forms of background check is favorable.  For these reasons, credit  
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history should be checked on individuals receiving permission to have unescorted access 
to secure areas.  In addition, a credit history check should be completed initially and each 
time the badge is renewed.   
2. Employment History 
Another commonly utilized method of determining an individual’s employment is 
a check of previous work history.  When employers review an individual’s work history, 
they are typically looking for red flags that might indicate the individual is not a good fit 
for the organization.  Matters such as low performance, disciplinary actions, or even job 
terminations are indicators that make the employer explore other attributes, either in 
writing or during interviews, areas of concern that may present a work place problem.   
While it is a common practice for many employers to check employment history 
prior to an offer of employment and an application for unescorted access being requested, 
work history is not currently shared with the airport operators as they attempt to evaluate 
the level of risk posed by the employee.   
The cost associated with this additional detail is moderate but the ability to raise 
situational awareness among the aviation security professionals is highly valuable.  
Therefore, while cost is nominal, the effectiveness is considered to be high when 
implemented in conjunction with other background measures.  The public perception 
would be favorable as employment history is a common benchmark in today’s work force 
and the expectation is already in place.  The implementation is considered very easy.  
Employment history checks are recommended for those that are requesting unescorted 
access to secure areas.   
3. Personal References 
Most applications for employment require an applicant to provide personal 
references.  Personal references are generally collected from individuals that have 
extended personal and work relationships with the applicant.  In many cases, those 
selected by an applicant as a personal reference have been prebriefed as to what 
information the applicant would like the individuals to give to the potential employer.  
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However, there are those occasions where a personal reference will be honest if asked 
about the applicants personal and work related behaviors.  This is one of those questions 
that if not asked relevant information might be missed that could aid the employer in 
determining suitability for employment.   
Also, personal references are frequently provided that are currently employees of 
the organization where the applicant is considering employment.  Having a personal 
reference coming from within the organization is viewed by the employer as beneficial 
since the personal reference; incumbent employee is more accountable for the reference 
that outside the organization.   An incumbent employee that provides a personal reference 
for an individual that is later hired and determined to be a poor performing has his or her 
integrity on the line.  As such, an incumbent employee is a good source for honest 
feedback in many cases.   
From the perspective of an aviation security profession, personal references offer 
several potential benefits.  First, just as the employer has the benefit of feedback from 
someone who has an extended personal or work history with the applicant, this can bear 
similar fruit for the aviation security professional.  If the person is considered a threat to 
aviation by the personal reference, there is a chance this will be communicated during an 
interview with the personal reference.   
In addition, there is a second benefit that is more subtle but just as powerful.  An 
applicant that list as his or her personal references individuals that themselves have 
questionable integrity would be a red flag for an aviation security professional.  A 
personal reference that was a known gang member, for instance, would be a red flag that 
would cause an aviation security professional to take note.  Here again, these linkages 
between applicant and a personal reference that is an incumbent employee make the 
connection even more important and easier to review.  An incumbent employee, who has 
been adequately vetted and approved to have a badge, is one who the aviation security 
professional has the ability to go back and research previous data bases looking for other 
known associates or suspicious behaviors. 
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Requiring personal references for the purpose of being granted unescorted access 
to secure areas is considered to be minimal in cost, easy to implement, and favored by the 
public.  In addition, the effectiveness of this measure, in conjunction with others 
recommended, is considered very high.   
4. Travel Patterns 
Over the last several years, the law enforcement community has been concerned 
and seen evidence of homegrown terrorist.  United States citizens who have turned to 
radical Islamic beliefs and conspire to attack the U.S. on behalf of foreign-based terrorist 
are just one form of a homegrown terrorist.  In many cases, homegrown terrorists have 
made multiple trips to foreign locations to obtain orders or participate in training to carry 
out a terrorist mission.   
U.S. citizens that travel to foreign locations are required to have a passport in 
order to travel.  As such, their travel is recorded and can aid the aviation security 
professional is seeing the entire picture of an individual’s motivations.  Since a passport 
is considered, in accordance with federal requirements, to be identification that is both 
proof of identity as well as employment authority, this form of documentation is 
commonly provided by applicants desiring unescorted access.   
Requiring an applicant to report previous travel outside of the U.S. is considered 
to be easy to implement, low cost, and favored by the general public.  Furthermore, the 
effectiveness is deemed high as it adds to the applicants overall profile and is useful when 
used in conjunction with other measures.  For these reasons, it is recommended that travel 
behavior is required to be reviewed initially and each time a badge is renewed.   
5. Driving Record 
An individual’s driving record is frequently a requirement for employment 
particularly when the position being applied for is one that requires a driver’s license and 
driving is an essential job function.  In addition to validating that an individual has 
current and legitimate license to drive a motor vehicle, it has additional benefit to the 
employer by demonstrating past driving behaviors that could cause an employer to reject 
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the applicant.  If the position is one that requires a fair amount of driving, employing 
someone that has numerous offenses for driving while intoxicated, speeding, or other 
moving violations may not be a good business decision.  
Likewise, requiring a review of an applicant’s driving record has merit for the 
aviation security professional.  One such benefit is that despite the relative ease 
associated with fraudulently producing a driver’s license, fabricating a fictitious driving 
record is much more difficult, particularly if the applicant has been licensed for several 
years.  Therefore, the benefit is one relating back to confirming identity discussed earlier. 
Second, driver’s license records indicate last registered address that could be different 
from the application and raise questions for the aviation security professional.   
Finally, many of the employee’s that have unescorted access to secure areas drive 
vehicles on the secure ramp next to and around commercial aircraft.  Individuals that 
have an extensive history of unsafe driving should be restricted from these close and high 
value encounters.   
A review of driving records can be easily attained, at very low cost, and would be 
considered favorably by the public. In addition, it would be very effective when 
employed in conjunction with the other measures discussed in the research and is 
recommended as a condition of access to secure areas.   
6. Psychological Evaluation 
Psychological evaluation is another measure employed in some cases during 
preemployment.  Typically, this measure is reserved for employment in areas where high 
levels of mental health are considered significant.  Job fields such as law enforcement are 
such positions due to the potential for litigation or life safety.   
While this measure has a place in the approval for an applicant to have unescorted 
access to secure areas, it is not recommended for adoption for several reasons.  The sheer 




would overwhelm the mental health system.  Just requiring police officers and other high 
security, high risk employees screened requires significant time to schedule and have 
completed.   
In addition the cost for such a high level of professional screening would make 
the cost benefit unbearable for most aviation employers.  While the public would support 
such an extreme measure, it would be very difficult and costly to implement.  The 
effectiveness is likely to be positive, but the other value streams would not support 
implementation.  Therefore, this measure if not being recommended as part of this 
research.   







High Favorable Low Easy 
Employment History 
High Favorable Low Easy 
Personal References 
High Favorable Low Easy 
Travel Patterns 
High Favorable Low Easy 
Driving Record 
High Favorable Low Easy 
Psychological Evaluation 
 High Favorable High Difficult 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The preceding research takes a very broad and misunderstood vulnerability and 
synthesizes it into an easily understandable and actionable product.  However, it is 
important to acknowledge that the issue is a highly complex one that has no single 
answer resolving the vulnerability. The size of the problem is compounded by the number 
of aviation insiders with access to secure areas, and the uniqueness of individual airports 
creates limitations for this author in addressing the problem from a national perspective.   
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This research offers a number of steps that can be taken collectively or 
incrementally that will aid in closing the gaps aviation insiders could exploit with some 
degree of ease within the current system.  It is recommended a pilot program, involving 
several airports of various sizes, be implemented to test the viability of the measures 
recommended in this thesis.   
Implementation costs for each measure will need to be more carefully calculated 
across the aviation domain as the information available to this author, while considered to 
be reliable, may not be repeatable at the over 400 airports in the United States.  Cost 
could be captured by a study or from the pilot program previously recommended.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Based the proceeding recommendation review, the following conclusions are 
provided for implementation. 
1. Changes to the Current Badging Process 
1. Eliminate proof of identification documentation that is not issued by the 
federal or state government. 
2. Implement a recheck of criminal history records with each badge renewal. 
3. Implement criminal and civil penalties for employees failing to self-
reporting convictions of disqualifying crimes. 
4. Require aviation employees with access to secure airport areas to report all 
arrests to the airport operator. 
5. Implement a requirement that criminal history records checks must 
include an ability to verify information for the full 10-year term and 
include juvenile crimes during the 10 year period.  The policy should 
include the following provisions: 
• Must be U.S. citizen for 10 years,  
• Must have lived in a country that will share criminal data during 
the 10-year period, or 
• Include juvenile history for employees 27 or younger.   
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6. Eliminate private sector (air carrier) authority to have employers 
unilaterally authorize badging of employees following reviewing of 
CHRC.  Require all CHRC be reviewed and approved by the airport 
operator as a single authority.   
2. Additional Measures Not Part of the Current Process 
In addition to the measures to the existing process, the following measures are 
considered effective and are recommended for implementation. 
1. Conduct a credit history report on all employees that require access to 
secure areas initially (before employment) and each time the badge is 
renewed. 
2. Complete a check of employee/applicant’s work history for the last 10 
years for new employees. 
3. Require all new employees to provide at least three personal references. 
4. Require all new employee/applicants and all incumbent employees with 
access to secure areas to provide full disclosure of all travel outside of the 
United States.   
5. Require airport operator driving history review of all new 
employee/applicants and all incumbent employees with access to secure 
areas. 
E. SUMMARY 
It is well documented and, above all obvious, that the threat imposed by aviation 
insiders, armed with knowledge and access is a vulnerability facing U.S. aviation.  
Although there is a clear threat, the way forward in managing the threat has been poorly 
researched and acted upon.  The complexities of the aviation insider threat frame the 
problem in an overwhelming manner.  
Further compounding the issue and diminishing action is that when suggestions 
are made to add steps or refine processes to further reduce the vulnerability, critics are 
quick to point out the imperfections within the suggestion.  The result is a paralysis 
among security specialists.  Typical of many aspects of government, this is an issue that 
those responsible for aviation security at all levels of government seem to lack the 
courage or expertise to face in a proactive manner.   
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This research does not intend to provide the perfect solution to eliminate the 
vulnerability.  The fact remains that predicting the future of an individual’s behavior or 
criminal intent without error is not feasible or possible.  That being the case, this research 
analysis’ current methods, looks at new innovations and steps to enhance the ability to 
manage the threat presented by insiders.  This research constitutes the most 
comprehensive body of research on the topic of insider threat in the aviation 
environment.  Furthermore, it provides recommendations that are reliable and actionable 
in combating the overwhelming nature of the issue.  As such, it provides the single best 
roadmap to address the issue. 
Unfortunately, this vulnerability may only be fully recognized and studied with 
steps taken to minimize the risk after an attack occurs.  The hope of this author is that 
through this research, it will bring awareness to the issue at the right levels of government 
and that actions will begin to be studied and implemented before the first attack occurs.   
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